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Beylin: Taxing Fictive Orders

TAXING FICTIVE ORDERS: HOW AN INFORMATION-FORCING
TAX CAN REDUCE MANIPULATION AND DISTORTION IN
FINANCIAL PRODUCT MARKETS
Ilya Beylin *

Electronic exchange “order books” reflect ready supply and demand for
financial products. This article proposes that order book information is
a public good and should be protected as such with an automated
Pigovian tax.
Traditional prohibitions on market manipulation do not reach conduct
that distorts order book information without intent to exploit the
distortion. As a result, anti-manipulation authorities do not deter
trading activity that generates market distortion as an incident to
trading activity rather than as an end goal. The great majority of orders
entered on contemporary electronic markets are cancelled before being
executed. The prevalence of order cancellations makes order book
information less reliable. The Dodd–Frank Act has prohibited
“spoofing,” or placing an order with intent to cancel it. The postDodd–Frank regime, however, is grossly inadequate. Punishing only
intentional order cancellations is both under- and over-inclusive. Unintended order cancellations are not simply likely, but represent the
great majority of orders in status quo market dynamics.
Unpremeditated order cancellations can pollute the price signal no less
than premeditated cancellations. On the over-inclusive side, consistent
rates of bid and offer cancellations should not significantly distort
prices and thus should not be punished even when planned.
Furthermore, the current pre-requisite of intent results in regressive
enforcement, high enforcement costs, and gross underenforcement.
Finally, the regime (and the literature) neglect the costs of artificial
silence and focus only on the excesses of noise. Nothing is being done
to deter artificial dearths of orders.
The Pigovian tax approach proposed by this article addresses these
shortfalls. The proposed approach also steers clear of typical concerns
with financial transaction taxes through focusing on cancelled rather
than executed orders. Regulators have been concerned with their lack
* University of Chicago, J.D., Stanford University, B.A.S. Adjunct professor at New York Law
School. I am grateful for the comments of many, including John Coffee, Ghazalle Badiozamani, Vince
Buccola, Assaf Hamdani, Alex Raskolnikov, Gabriel Rauterberg, Sloan Speck, Eric Talley, Fred Tung,
David Walker, and many workshop participants at Boston University, the National Business Law
Scholars Conference, and Columbia Law School Fellows Workshop.
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of authority to police trading that generates high volumes of cancelled
orders. This article explains why such authority is justified, as well as
how current anti-manipulation regimes can be buttressed.
I. INTRODUCTION
“[The] authority of the majority is partly based upon the notion that
there is more intelligence and wisdom in a number of men united than in
a single individual, and that the number of the legislators is more
important than their quality.”
– Alexis De Tocqueville,
Democracy in America1
Modesty has long been both virtue and vice. Humans are fallible and
have limited information. Deference and emulation temper our biases,
allow us to share rich cultural and intellectual inventories. But
deference and emulation have also led common sense and moral
intuition to cede to foolishness and barbarism if well enough entrenched.
The dynamics of excessive deference are on display daily in our
financial markets.
Financial markets support mutually beneficial exchange, enabling
capital formation, savings, and risk transfer. In addition to their private
uses, financial markets also produce prices, an important public good.
Financial product prices aggregate otherwise diffused and mute beliefs.
Over the long run, the value of a financial product corresponds to the
expected cash flows due to the holder of the product. Many products,
however, have long durations or complex terms. Traders each have
their own vantage from which they forecast a product’s performance, so
beliefs as to future cash flows can and do differ. Market participants
know they are acting on limited information, and that others are too.
This leads to a simultaneously mature and highly insecure mental
predisposition. A price represents more than any one trader knows, a
reality that rewards intellectual modesty. But diffidence has its costs,
and traders self-consciously acting on incomplete information are
susceptible to manipulation as well as over-reaction.
In the morning of May 6, 2010, the profound insecurity governing
financial markets was on display as traders reacted to large sell-orders
on S&P futures by reducing demand at all-but-the-lowest of prices.2
1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 299 (Henry Reeve trans., Longman,
Green, Longman & Roberts 1862).
2. JOINT CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES,
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010,
at 2 (Feb. 18, 2011) (“In the present environment, where high frequency and algorithmic trading
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The herding resulted in a loss of approximately one trillion dollars from
U.S. equity markets over the course of just a few hours. 3 This market
event evolved from the independent conduct of thousands of traders and
has become known as the “Flash Crash.” 4 The U.S. government has
alleged that a significant portion of the sell-orders that started the
stampede are attributable to Navinder Singh Sarao, a young man living
with his parents in an immigrant suburb of London. 5 The complaint
alleges that the large sell orders were placed in a manner that guaranteed
they would not be executed against and were designed to allow him to
profit from purchasing S&P contracts at reduced prices. 6 Charges that a
youth working an ocean away and without any serious financial or
technological sophistication drastically impacted the world’s deepest
financial market reflect the remarkable democratization of financial
access wrought by technology, as well as the attendant risks. 7
The prices of financial products are important indicators that inform a
variety of economic activity. As unpacked by this article, price
information comes from two interrelated sources: the order book and the
ticker tape. Order books collect orders from traders to buy or sell a
financial product in an amount and at a price specified in the order. In
the olden days, order books were paper notepads where exchange
employees wrote down orders, manually matching traders that wanted to
sell with traders that wanted to buy. Nowadays, transactions take place
through electronic order books that automatically match digital orders to
sell with digital orders to buy. Order books collect the demand and
supply for financial products, providing the number of units “the
market” (i.e., traders participating in the marketplace) would sell at
increasingly higher prices and the number of units the market would buy
predominate and where exchange competition has essentially eliminated rule-based market maker
obligations, liquidity problems are an inherent difficulty that must be addressed. Indeed, even in the
absence of extraordinary market events, limit order books can quickly empty and prices can crash
simply due to the speed and numbers of orders flowing into the market and due to the ability to instantly
cancel orders.”).
3. Matt Levine, Guy Trading at Home Caused the Flash Crash, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr. 21,
2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-04-21/guy-trading-at-home-caused-the-flashcrash.
4. See Matt Egan, Flash Crash: Could It Happen Again?, CNN (May 6, 2014, 3:58 PM),
money.cnn.com/2014/05/06/investing/flash-crash-anniversary/.
5. Criminal Complaint, United States v. Sarao, No. 15-CR-00075 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2015);
Kim Hjelmgaard & Jane Onyanga-Omara, Alleged 'Flash Crash' Trader Lived an Unflashy Life,
USATODAY (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/04/22/navindersingh-sarao-british-flash-crash-trader/26174581/.
6. Criminal Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 21.
7. The Department of Justice’s causal theory linking Mr. Sarao’s activities to the flash crash is
in dispute. See, e.g., Eric M. Aldrich, Joseph Grundfest & Gregory Laughlin, The Flash Crash: A New
Deconstruction
6
(Sept.
22,
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2721922).
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as prices decrease. In addition to price data on current supply and
demand in the order book, there is price data on executed transactions.
Like the presentation of order book data, the presentation of executed
transaction data has evolved with technology. Originally transmitted by
telegraph and printed on a thin strip of paper, executed transaction data
is today presented as pixels on screens but is still referred to as “ticker
tape” data after the sound the telegraph made. Of course, the order book
and ticker tape are as entwined as the present and the future—the prices
at which traders are willing to buy or sell determine the prices at which
transactions are executed; in turn, the prices at which transactions have
been executed inform the prices at which traders are willing to buy and
sell.
The ability to freely place orders and then cancel them combined with
automated trading technology allows significant disinformation to enter
the market. While manual cancellations were generally free, they took
trader time both to process changes in economic and market conditions
and to issue the instruction to cancel prior orders. Computerized
processing of information allows analyses that took a day to take place
in milliseconds. Orders can be sent and pulled back immediately as new
data comes in. 8 This contributes to the fragility and volatility of order
book information. As buy (or sell) orders arrive in large volumes,
greater demand (or supply) is broadcast to the market and deferential
algorithms immediately follow suit by withdrawing sell (or buy) orders.
Similarly, as buy (or sell) orders are cancelled in large volumes,
computerized traders react by withdrawing their buy (or sell) orders.
Since 2012, the ratio of fulfilled orders to cancelled orders on U.S.
securities exchanges regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) generally fluctuated between 1 to 14 and 1 to 30. 9
Order cancellation rates on futures markets regulated by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have been lower but still cover the
vast majority of all orders entered. 10 Supply and demand reflected in the
order books of securities and derivatives exchanges 11 is predominantly
8. The algorithms directing trading activity take into account only predefined data feeds. Thus,
reactions to developments are necessarily based on a reductive view of the conditions in the relevant
market, industry, asset class, or general economy. Sharp changes in order-book information cannot be
easily ignored because they may correspond to unobserved changes in broader conditions.
9. Trade to Order Volume Ratios, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 9, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/highlight-2013-01.html (Oct. 9, 2013).
10. Scott Patterson, CFTC Targets Rapid Trades, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2012, 9:01 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303863404577283850694110794 (“An estimated 80
to 90 orders are put into futures markets for every trade that actually happens . . . .”).
11. The discussion in this article generally applies to many-to-many electronic markets for
financial products where transactions are entered into anonymously through matching of publicly
disclosed orders. Although the term “exchange” is used, the intuitions are equally applicable to
platforms regulated other than as exchanges. In other words, the term exchange is not intended to refer
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fictive.
Significant fluctuations in order volumes can serve strategies to move
prices in ways favorable to the trader entering and cancelling orders.
Such practices are forms of market manipulation and have been illegal
for decades. 12 The Dodd–Frank Act passed in 2010 has further
prohibited placing an order with intent to cancel it, or “spoofing,”
expanding the regulatory toolkit for addressing intentionally distortive
activities. 13 As explored herein, these tools are unwieldy in the typical
context of sophisticated, algorithmic trading, particularly where it has an
international component. Furthermore, these tools do not reach trading
algorithms that in effect, but unintentionally, create misleading order
flow.
Orders that are cancelled, or “fictive orders,” impair the public good
produced through transparent financial markets. 14 This is true both
where order cancellation is premeditated and when it occurs in response
to market developments. First, fictive orders affect expectations as to
the price at which a transaction could be entered into through
misrepresenting market depth and market direction. In this manner,
fictive orders tarnish the informational value of prices ex ante. Second,
fictive orders affect trading decisions and may—as in the case of
manipulation—distort the price at which transactions are entered into.
In other words, fictive orders also tarnish the informational value of
prices ex post. This article’s contribution is in identifying the publicgood nature of order information, understanding how the current set of
protections falls short in protecting the public good, and proposing a
regulatory intervention that takes the public-good nature of order
information seriously while also improving on the current regimes
policing price-distortive activity.
Like other commercial activity that detracts from a public good, the
cancellation of orders represents pollution. The pollution analogy is apt
on two dimensions. First, like pollution, fictive orders interfere with use
of a shared resource, namely price information. Second, fictive orders,
like pollution, may be a byproduct of valuable commercial activity.
Absent environmental regulations, a coal plant may belch CO2 not
solely to entities regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission as “exchanges.” See Regulation
of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39884 (Apr. 17, 1998).
12. See cases cited infra note 60.
13. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 747, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)
(2012); see also discussion infra Section II.A.
14. Information that improves decision-making is a classic example of a public good. Francis M.
Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351, 369 (1958) (“The defining quality of a pure
public good is that ‘each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any
other individual’s consumption of that good. . . .’”); see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public
Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. STAT. 387 (1954).
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because it seeks to achieve global warming but because it is in
competition with other market participants that do not expend the
additional costs to build cleaner smoke stacks. In keeping with
strategies to reduce pollution in other contexts, this article proposes a
Pigovian tax on the pollution from cancelled orders. 15 The tax would be
imposed on asymmetric order cancellation that leads to exaggerated
supply or demand, and would impose higher costs on those that cancel
orders in higher quantities in shorter periods of time. In other words, the
impact of the tax would fall on those behaviors that are most likely to
destabilize pricing. Revenue obtained from the tax can subsidize
executed transactions, so as to counteract adverse effects on liquidity
that may otherwise follow the tax. Furthermore, the re-distribution can
be designed to mitigate a second, heretofore unregulated risk to price
discovery: market participants’ forbearance from order entry. Just as an
excess of orders over actual supply-and-demand fundamentals can
distort prices, an artificial dearth can also result in mis-information.
The rest of this paper proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an
introduction to financial markets, explains how orders relate to prices,
and identifies why prices serve as public goods. Part II explains the
inadequacy of current regulatory approaches to maintaining price
integrity, and in particular, the ill fit between scienter-based liability
standards under anti-manipulation prohibitions and the anonymous,
electronic trading environment in which orders are placed today. Part II
also introduces the tax on fictive orders. Part III considers alternative
strategies for deploying the tax on fictive orders. In assessing the tax,
Part III shows how this proposal improves on prior financial transaction
tax proposals. Prior proposals would tax all orders or all executed
transactions; in contrast, a tax falling solely on cancelled orders carries
limited adverse consequences for actual users of financial products.
II. HOW MARKETS FORM PRICES AND PROVIDE LIQUIDITY
Markets come in two varieties. There are one-to-many markets,
where a single buyer or a single seller transacts with multiple
counterparts. And there are many-to-many markets, where a variety of
buyers and sellers come together to trade in parallel. The former model
is instantiated in the local pharmacy, flower shop, or hardware store.
The latter model is especially prominent in the new economy as digital
technology and the Internet enable online markets where unrelated
sellers can offer their products or services and unrelated buyers can bid
15. See Dennis W. Carlton & Glenn C. Loury, The Limitation of Pigouvian Taxes as a Long-Run
Remedy for Externalities: An Extension of Results, 101 Q. J. ECON. 631 (1986) for a brief analysis of the
Pigovian tax.
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on them, with Uber, Airbnb, Etsy, and countless other platforms serving
as examples. However, the many-to-many model has a rich tradition
with commercial meeting places such as bazaars dating back millennia.
In the financial context, exchanges and other platforms create manyto-many markets, aggregating the supply and demand for financial
products and routinizing the execution of transactions between
counterparties that have matching interests. 16 In today’s digital
environment, many financial products such as equities and futures trade
predominantly on electronic platforms and the execution of other
financial products such as swaps is migrating to electronic platforms. 17
Dealers 18 are market participants that make a business of buying at the
lowest price at which a product is offered and selling at the highest price
at which the product is bid on, a practice known as “taking the
spread.” 19 As discussed below, this practice helps exchanges attract
customers by creating opportunities for them to transact.
A. How Order Books Aggregate Supply and Demand
Supply or demand on a platform is expressed through an “order.” 20
Orders to buy are referred to as “bids” and orders to sell are referred to
as “offers.” At the minimum, an order identifies the financial product
desired to be bought or sold and the quantity of the financial product.
Orders come in several varieties, most important of which are market
orders and limit orders. A market order does not communicate a price
and represents a bid (offer) to buy (sell) at the lowest (highest) price
available at the time the order is placed. A limit order, in addition to
identifying the product and quantity, defines the price at which it should
be executed. As a result, limit orders may not be executed immediately
when they are entered and, instead, are stored by the platform. Many
16. Dealers acting on exchanges make a business of entering buy and sell orders and profiting
from the spread in prices between the lowest priced order to sell and the highest priced order to buy.
This article refers to market participants that make a business from buying and selling financial products
as “dealers,” although the terms “market-maker” and “liquidity provider” are also commonly used.
These terms have defined meanings under statutes, regulations, and exchange rules governing financial
markets, but these legal definitions are not intended to be used throughout the article. See, e.g.,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(5) (2012) (defining dealers in securities).
17. 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(8) (2012); see Process for a Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution
Facility to Make a Swap Available to Trade, Swap Transaction Compliance and Implementation
Schedule, and Trade Execution Requirement Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,606,
33,606 (June 4, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 37, 38).
18. These market participants are alternately referred to as dealers, market makers, or liquidity
providers, and these terms are used interchangeably throughout the article.
19. This is no different from dealers—such as used auto dealers—in non-financial markets,
except that financial products are no worse for wear.
20. See generally, Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock
Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 220 (2015).
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platforms such as stock exchanges and futures markets publicize
unexecuted limit orders, and in so doing inform market participants as to
available demand and supply at different price points. This record of
waiting orders is referred to as an “order book.” The usefulness and
protection of the informational content of order books is the topic of this
article.
A hypothetical example of what an order book may look like for
shares of Apple is shown in Table 1.
Price (in USD)
Bid Quantity
Offer Quantity
120.03
500,000
120.04
250,000
120.05
100,000
120.06
50,000
120.07
200,000
120.08
600,000
Table 1: Order Book for Apples Shares
Table 1 shows that there is demand for 100,000 shares of Apple stock
at the price of $120.05 per share, and that demand increases by 250,000
shares if the prices drops a penny, and by an additional 500,000 shares if
the price falls another penny. Conversely, there is a supply of 50,000
shares at the price of $120.06 per share, and additional supply of
200,000 shares at a price one penny higher and 600,000 shares at a price
that is two pennies higher. This order book reflects a fairly small spread
between the price at which buyers would buy and sellers would sell. 21
The midpoint between the highest bid and lowest offer suggests that the
market price of a share of Apple is approximately $120.055. The order
book also reveals how many shares a seller could dispose of if she was
willing to immediately accept a price within a few pennies of the market
price, and similarly, how many shares a buyer could obtain if she was
willing to immediately pay a price within a few pennies of the market
price. Immediately is a key qualifier, because the contents of the order
book may change as new orders are matched against contra-orders
resting in the order book, additional limit orders are entered into the
order book, or, of central importance to this article, resting orders are
cancelled.
An automated order book generally matches bids and offers based on
price, and then breaks ties based on the length of time that an order was
21. Penny sized increments between order book prices are used for illustration. Minimum
permissible price increments between orders (called tick sizes) differ across stocks. See Joint Industry
Plans; Order Approving the National Market System Plan to Implement a Tick Size Pilot Program,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-74892 (May 6, 2015).
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resting in the order book. 22 Thus, traders have incentives to place orders
early. Being able to cancel orders enables a trader to place orders at
prices far from the current market price so that her orders are executed
before others’ orders when prices move without also accepting the risk
that she will be forced to enter into an undesirable transaction. These
dynamics lead to large numbers of orders being entered with a “waitand-see” attitude and then being cancelled when market prices evolve.
Because it is costless to withdraw orders, the supply and demand
information in order books is unreliable.
B. Price Information in Order Books Is a Public Good
Price information is a public good as it assists with a diverse set of
economic decisions. Scholarship largely accepts that more accurate
pricing of financial products contributes to social welfare, as discussed
in more detail below. 23 The order book and the ticker tape are the two
primary sources of price information on financial products. The former
reports current supply and demand for a financial product, as discussed
above. The latter provides price and volume data for already executed
transactions.
Ticker tape data on executed transactions differs in several respects
from that of order book data. Consummated transactions reflect a
mutually costly exchange between market participants, and thus carry
additional credibility. By its very nature, however, a consummated
transaction reveals valuation decisions made by only two parties.
Transaction data does not express the valuation opinions of other market
participants. As a result, one foolish or desperate buyer or seller can
skew the price reflected in transaction data. Furthermore, consummated
transactions necessarily reflect prior as opposed to current circumstances
and thus may be stale.
Even if price information for executed transactions did not suffer
from the above deficiencies, it could not be decoupled from order book
price information. The prices at which transactions are executed
informs the prices at which orders are entered. In turn, the prices at
which orders are entered informs the prices at which additional orders
are entered and determines the prices at which transactions are executed.
Because the prices at which market participants express a willingness to
trade and the prices at which they do trade are codependent, order book
22. This is known as the first-in-first-out method of order matching, and some exchanges are
moving away from it. Carol L. Clark, Market Structure, Incentives, and Fragility, CHI. FED LETTER
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi.), Mar. 2014, at 3.
23. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Art Durnev, Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Law, Share Price
Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 339 (2003).
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price information cannot be seen as a substitute for ticker tape price
information. Rather, the integrity of the order book is reflected in the
ticker tape.
Not all markets share data on executed transactions or their order
books; however, those that do produce a valuable public good in so
doing. 24 Finance scholars and practitioners price a financial product
based on estimates of cash flows deliverable on the product. 25 These
projections embedded in financial product prices inform a variety of
economically significant decisions. 26 Price information helps those with
financial positions, such as investors holding securities and derivatives
counterparties, calculate the value of their portfolio.
Price information relating to securities assists a variety of decisions in
the corporate context. 27 Accurate security prices reduce agency costs.28
For example, share price performance helps investors and directors
evaluate management, thus serving as a key input into corporate
governance decisions. Mis-priced shares can lead to erroneous retention
decisions, for example when a well (poorly) performing CEO is
terminated (retained) because a company’s share price is inaccurately
depressed (inflated).
Equity-based managerial compensation
complements monitoring through aligning managerial interests with
those of shareholders. Alignment, however, relies on share prices
accurately reflecting the long-term health of the company; if
management can dispose of its equity at a high price while the long-term
prospects of the firm are dim, equity compensation may do little to
ensure officers act in the best interests of shareholders. Securities prices
also help management intelligently deploy internal resources. Through

24. See Patterson, supra note 10.
25. ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 605-07 (McGraw-Hill Irwin, 7th
Ed. 2008). These projections are necessarily fraught with error and may be biased or omit nonmonetary benefits accorded to their holder, such as the consumption benefits of controlling a company
afforded to the holder of a large enough block of shares.
26. Kevin Haeberle, Stock Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’ Stock Prices,
2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121 (2015).
27. BODIE ET AL., supra note 25, at 9 (“Investors in the stock market ultimately decide which
companies will live and which will die. If a corporation seems to have good prospects of future
profitability, investors will bid up its stock price. . . . If, on the other hand, a company’s prospects seem
poor, investors will bid down its stock price. . . . The process by which capital is allocated through the
stock market sometimes seems wasteful. Some companies can be ‘hot’ for a short period of time, attract
a large flow of investor capital, and then fail after only a few years. But that is an unavoidable aspect of
economic progress. It is impossible to accurately predict which ventures will succeed and which will
fail. But the stock market encourages allocation of capital to those firms that appear at the time to have
the best prospects. Many smart, well-trained, and well-paid professionals analyze the prospects of firms
whose shares trade on the stock market. Stock prices reflect their collective judgment.”).
28. David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell
eds., Elgar Publishers) (2012).
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suggesting cash flows expected from operations in the status quo,
security prices create a threshold for profitability that must be met by
new projects or expansions of existing projects. Under-priced shares
result in the issuer excessively expanding operations rather than
returning earnings to shareholders. Over-priced shares result in
businesses foregoing desirable projects. Security price information also
enables a business to estimate its cost of capital. Bond yields and share
prices express how much interest the issuer would have to pay or how
much it would have to dilute its current shareholders to raise additional
funds. Inaccurate prices may undermine financing efforts if the
correction occurs during the financing or, if mis-pricing persists, lead to
over- or under-allocation of capital to the firm.
Security price information also informs employees, vendors, and
other constituents making firm-specific investments as to the health of
the firm. 29 Inaccurate share prices may lead to inefficient transactions
(or inefficiently-foregone transactions) between the issuer and its
counterparties. For example, a prospective employee may turn down
employment based on inaccurately-depressed share price out of concern
that insolvency is near and she would soon have to retrain for a new
employer. Or a vendor may invest in custom-built machine tools to
supply parts to a firm based on the firm’s inflated share prices only to
have to scrap the tools when the firm enters liquidation.
Prices in derivatives markets similarly inform (and, if incorrect,
misinform) significant business decisions. Derivatives allow parties to
enter into positions based on operational or financial risks encountered
in their business. 30 For example, derivatives may be used to take
positions on interest rates, currency exchange rates, physical commodity
prices (such as metal, energy and foodstuffs), or even the weather and
population longevity. 31 Derivative prices inform firms as to the cost of
hedging risks (for example, the costs to a soda producer of corn syrup
inputs or fuel costs to an airline). Derivative prices also enable firms to
value and manage their inventories, such as where credit default swap
(CDS) prices are used by a bank to estimate default likelihood on a loan
to a borrower referenced in the CDS.
In appreciating the usefulness of accurate price information to a
variety of economic decisions, it is important not to forget limitations on

29. Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1911 (2013).
30. Derivatives—like other financial instruments—may be used for socially adverse ends. See
Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting
Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007).
31. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Comm’r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (discussing role of hedging through
corn futures contracts in the business of a corn product manufacturer, and in particular, why the
liquidation of corn future contracts is subject to taxation as ordinary income).
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the accuracy of prices. Financial theory does not assert that prices
accurately express future cash flows from financial products; rather,
financial theory supports that, in markets with low transaction costs,
prices reflect available information regarding future cash flows. 32 Some
of the mechanics through which prices adjust to new information are
discussed below, and as will be apparent in that discussion, the costs of
transacting figure prominently into the responsiveness of prices to new
information. Yet however incomplete prices may be in reflecting cash
flows due on an instrument, they serve as a valuable source of
information.
Order book price information is interdependent with ticker tape price
information, as discussed above. Thus, all price information relies on
order book integrity. In addition, the order book provides price
information that is not found on the ticker tape—in particular, current
supply and demand curves for a financial product. Protecting the
accuracy of order book price information as discussed in this article
helps assure both the accuracy of the ticker tape and the reliability of the
unique price information found in the order book. Protecting price
information is justified because it represents a public good. However, as
discussed next, there may be costs to preserving the accuracy of price
information. These costs are discussed, and then the next part turns to
the current regime for protecting price information.
C. Financial Market Quality is a Function of Price Accuracy and
Liquidity
Price discovery refers to the process through which prices adjust to
reflect new information available to one or more market participants. 33
For example, an industry analyst may identify that a competitor has filed
a patent for a disruptive technology that will obsolesce an issuer’s
product. That analyst may model resulting decreases in issuer revenues
and, on the basis of those decreases, calculate a discount to the issuer’s
currently anticipated cash flows. The analyst may then sell the issuer’s
stock short at a price below that prevailing in the market. 34 That short
32. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still
a Matter of Information Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 313, 317–18 (2014).
33. Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Wei Jiang & Joshua Mitts, How Quickly Do Markets Learn? Private
Information Dissemination in a Natural Experiment 2–3 (Columbia Bus. Sch., Research Paper No. 15-6,
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544128 (“[T]he theoretical literature . . . has
developed a thorough framework for how securities prices incorporate private information through the
work of informed traders. . . .”).
34. A short sale is a sale of an asset that is not held in inventory, which is made with the
expectation of purchasing that asset at a later time. Short sales are made by traders expecting prices to
decline, so that the sold asset can be repurchased at a lower price. To deliver the asset at the time of the
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sale will reduce share price through two vectors. First, it will simply
reduce demand at the highest price point(s) from the market. For
example, in the Apple illustration above, if the analyst sold 100,000
shares at $120.05, the highest bid remaining in the market would be for
$120.04. Second, transactions disclose information to the market. A
large sale of securities tells the market that either the seller needs cash or
that the seller believes the securities will lose value. 35 Which of those
two causes leads to a sale is unknown. However, there is some non-zero
likelihood of each motivation, so the buyer would downwardly adjust its
expectations in response to the transaction. Scholars believe and
empirical evidence supports that market prices impound private
information revealed through changes in supply or demand for financial
products. 36 Accordingly, the result of the informed short sale would be
to reduce the demand for the issuer’s stock. This reduction represents
order-book-price data learning from the analyst, albeit understanding
only that prices are expected to decline and not why they would.
Rules designed to benefit price discovery can impede liquidity, and
vice versa. The process of price discovery produces winners and losers.
Informed traders profit at the expense of the less informed traders. In
addition to redistributing wealth, this process may have regressive
consequences to the extent that uninformed traders tend to be pension
funds, mutual funds and other stores of savings for retail investors. The
reward of informed traders at the expense of uninformed traders may
also drive the latter from participating in the market. Departure of
potential counterparties can impair market function through
downgrading a platform from many-to-many to some-to-some. 37
Uninformed investors that place non-marketable 38 limit orders benefit
the market through providing “liquidity.” 39 Liquidity refers to the costs
short sale, the seller generally has to borrow it from another party (and then on purchasing the asset
from the market, “return” the purchased asset to the borrower).
35. Disposing of securities raises cash. That cash may then be used to make other investments,
(e.g., to diversify the investment portfolio) or the cash may be used for non-investment purposes. Note
that diversification can occur through purchasing under-represented investments in addition to selling
over-represented investments.
36. See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market:
Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 220 (2015) (“With a sufficient number of trades, the market
price will come to reflect private information.”); John D. Montgomery, Spoofing, Market Manipulation
1
(May
3,
2016),
and
the
Limit-Order
Book,
NAVIGANT
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2780579.
37. See generally George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
38. Non-marketable limit orders refer to those limit orders that are not immediately executed
against other limit orders waiting in the order book.
39. Informed investors may also place limit orders that increase liquidity, but as they generally
have a sense of the direction in which the market is moving, informed traders generally place
marketable buy orders (if they expect prices to increase) or sell orders (if they expect prices to decrease).
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of executing a transaction within a market, and thus largely depends on
the availability of counterparties willing to trade. If the midpoint
between the lowest offer and the highest bid represents an
approximation of the market price, the difference between the midpoint
and the lowest offer represents a premium that a buyer would have to
pay over the market price to obtain the desired instrument; and similarly,
the difference between the midpoint and the highest bid represents the
discount that a seller would have to accept to dispose of the instrument.
Of course, depending on the size of the order, the quantity at the lowest
offer or highest bid may be insufficient to satisfy the full order; as a
result, more complex measures of liquidity exist for characterizing the
ease of transacting through a particular market. 40
Exchanges seek to have fulsome order books to attract customers.
After all, who would go to a bazaar where no goods were changing
hands? A variety of traders supply limit orders. 41 To fill their order
books, some exchanges offer bounties to traders placing limit orders that
are subsequently executed against. 42 Although exchange rules vary,
these bounties are usually reserved for dealers that meet minimum order
volume requirements. 43 Because limit orders at the same price are
executed based on how long they have been exposed to the market
through the order book, traders have incentives to place limit orders
early and then potentially cancel as market conditions evolve. The
bounty paid to liquidity providers is offset by a premium charged to
those placing marketable orders that execute against resting orders (i.e.,
liquidity providers are subsidized, whereas liquidity takers are
charged). 44 A second source of revenues to liquidity providers is the
“spread,” or the difference in price between how much they pay to take
an instrument into inventory and how much they receive on disposing of
an instrument. In the Apple stock example above, if a liquidity provider
was buying at $120.05 per share and selling at $120.06 per share, the
40. Michael J. Fleming, Measuring Treasury Market Liquidity, ECON. POL’Y REV., Sept. 2003 at
83.
41. Market participants alternately known as dealers, market makers, or liquidity providers make
a business of entering limit orders on exchanges and profiting from the spread. See supra note 16.
However, retail traders and institutions investing on their behalf can and do also engage in placing limit
orders. As a clarifying note responding to some early readers, exchanges themselves do not place
orders; rather, they design the environment for attracting liquidity and maintaining price integrity.
Exchanges administer the mechanics of order entry, matching, and execution, and, subject to regulatory
requirements, police trading conduct and support market integrity. Exchanges may also supply ancillary
services, such as data feeds based on orders and executions.
42. NYSE Trading Information, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/markets/nyse/tradinginfo#trading-fees (last visited Aug. 28, 2016).
43. See, e.g., Membership, EURONEXT, https://www.euronext.com/nl/membership/liquidityproviders-and-market-makers (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
44. NYSE Trading Information, supra note 42.
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liquidity provider would earn a penny on each pair of offsetting
transactions.
To the extent liquidity providers are not themselves informed, they
are susceptible to losses when transacting with informed traders. While
market prices stay constant, a liquidity provider can continue to earn
revenues from the spread. However, if market prices deteriorate, a
liquidity provider’s inventory will devalue (or, conversely where
inventory is negative, a short position 45 will become more expensive to
cover as market prices rise). To stay in business, liquidity providers
must obtain enough revenue to offset inventory losses from market
movements. 46 To compensate for expected losses, scholars have posited
that liquidity providers increase the spread between their bids and offers
in the presence of informed traders. 47 In particular, a liquidity
provider’s standing offer reflects the provider’s expectation that the
matching bid may be from a trader with information suggesting that
prices are going up; and reciprocally, the liquidity provider’s standing
bid reflects expectations that the matching offer may be from a trader
with information suggesting prices are going to decline. 48 Empirical
evidence supports these suppositions, showing that liquidity providers
decrease their bids in response to excess supply and increase their offers
in response to excess demand. 49
The availability of liquidity determines whether parties can enter into
transactions, which in turn can serve important social goals. The costs
of selling a security inform how much a purchaser would pay for it in
the first place, and thus reduce how much capital investors would
contribute to the issuer in exchange for the security. This reduction is
known as the illiquidity discount. The illiquidity discount links the
health of primary markets, where issuers obtain capital to finance
operations in exchange for claims on their assets, to the health of
secondary markets, where the securities are subsequently traded.
Liquidity also impacts capacity to save. The costs attendant on
purchasing a security determine how easy it is to convert cash into
45. See supra note 34.
46. Unbiased fluctuations in market price are as likely to profit as harm the liquidity provider.
As a result, liquidity providers are less concerned with volatility than directional movements in market
price.
47. See Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask
Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1988); Kalok Chan, Y. Peter Chung & Herb Johnson, The Intraday
Behavior of Bid-Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks and CBOE Options, 30 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 329 (1995).
48. Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask
Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1988); Kalok Chan, Y. Peter Chung & Herb Johnson, The Intraday
Behavior of Bid-Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks and CBOE Options, 30 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 329 (1995).
49. Id.
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income earning investments. The higher the transaction costs of saving,
the less consumption will be deferred to the future. Higher transaction
costs can impoverish the elderly and reduce the transmission of wealth
across generations. The costs of security transactions also inform how
expensive it is to diversify an investment portfolio. Absent
diversification, investors are exposed to risk without concomitant
reward. Because individuals are risk averse and need steady cash flows
to support their standard of living, uncompensated variation in returns is
undesirable.
Illiquidity also has adverse consequence in derivatives markets.
Many companies use derivatives to hedge risk. 50 Risk may derive from
the fluctuation in prices of inputs such as metals, energy, and
agricultural products; or risk may derive from volatility of financial
variables such as interest rates on outstanding debt or currency exchange
rates at which international revenues are repatriated. In either case,
derivatives may be used to reduce exposure to fluctuation such as
through purchasing futures on inputs or entering into swaps on interest
and currency exchange rates. Reducing liquidity in derivatives markets
has the effect of making these risk management transactions more
expensive and thus increasing the uncertainty that businesses and
individuals contend with.
As already noted above, and will be revisited throughout this paper, a
tension exists between the accuracy of a market’s prices and the
market’s liquidity. Market policies must frequently negotiate tradeoffs
between, on the one hand, the benefits of price discovery, and on the
other hand, the benefits of liquidity. Insufficient liquidity or insufficient
price discovery can have negative externalities, and thus any regulations
affecting either should be carefully designed to balance the competing
public interests. This balance is considered in the next two parts as the
current regime protecting order-book information and the proposed
improvement on it are discussed.
III. REMEDIES TO FICTIVE TRADING
Order cancellations may impose two types of harms. The first, where
the cancellation exploits other market participants to the advantage of
the trader placing and cancelling orders, is effectively a form of theft.
The second, which can occur irrespective of whether the cancellation is
premeditated, is a form of pollution. In designing a regulatory response
to these two forms of harm, what relevance should the trader’s mental

50. Henk Berkman & Michael E. Bradbury, Empirical Evidence on the Corporate Use of
Derivatives, 25 FIN. MGMT. 5 (1996).
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state have?
Professor Raskolnikov explores the significance of intent as a
predicate to liability, creating a useful frame to parse the two distinct
harms that order cancellation may cause. 51 Private, nonconsensual
transfers are “irredeemably inefficient acts.” 52 Although the transfer
itself may be neutral from a purely utilitarian standpoint—as ex ante
neither party is likelier to receive greater utility from the transferred
resource—social resources will be wasted in contending over the
transfer. The transferor will invest in accomplishing the transfer and the
transferee will invest in resisting it. Unintentional acts with distributive
consequences do not result in the same dissipation through effectuation
and defense. For this reason, an economist would argue, we do not
punish the person accidentally taking another’s umbrella from a pile at
the entrance of a restaurant, but do punish the person that steals an
umbrella from a briefcase. Manipulation through fictive orders is an
example of coercive transfer, where one party expends efforts to distort
prices while other market participants expend efforts not to be exploited
through manipulation. 53 As discussed in more detail below, prohibitions
on manipulation have been in place to deter this conduct; however, they
are of limited effectiveness due to the difficulties of showing requisite
mens rea.
Even if a trader does not intend to distort prices through entering and
cancelling orders, distortion can be harmful. The cancellation of orders
can impose harm even where it does not lead to a coerced transfer. 54 As
introduced above, the order book should be seen as a public good.
Demand and supply curves exhibited in the order book help inform
decisions. 55 The impairment of order book information results in social
harm irrespective of whether the impairment is intentional.
Contemporary financial regulation fails to recognize this second type of
harm from fictive orders.
Securities and derivatives laws attach liability to price-distorting
conduct such as order cancellations only in the presence of recklessness

51. Alex Raskolnikov, Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat to Markets, Firms, and the Fisc,
102 GEO. L.J. 1133 (2014).
52. Id. at 1135.
53. Either an information cost story or a behavioralist story, which I believe are synonymous but
politically distinct narratives of the same phenomena, explain the observed market response to order
imbalances. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999).
54. Regulators have raised concerns that electronic traders do not internalize the harm done by
their fictive orders. JOINT CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 11–12.
55. Order book price information also helps determine the prices at which transactions are
executed, affecting the second source of price information—the ticker tape.
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or more culpable scienter. 56 These scienter-based standards have been
ineffective at protecting price integrity on securities and derivatives
exchanges. As explained by Andrew Ceresney, Director of the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement, trading practices may “disrupt[] our markets
or call[] into question the fair operation or integrity of our markets,
whether [they consist of] fraudulent misconduct or unreasonable
failures—which often can be as harmful as fraudulent conduct.” 57 In the
absence of regulatory response to cancellation dynamics, traditional
principles of contract law allowing for withdrawal of an offer prior to
acceptance do not adequately recognize the interests of third parties in
price information. 58 This is particularly true given the absence of
reputational means to discipline distortive cancellations due to the
anonymous nature of electronic trading. This part develops on these
observations, explaining why the current regime for addressing fictive
trading is inadequate.
The current regime only weakly deters
manipulation and does not protect the order book from unintentional
cancellations that pollute price information.
A. Prohibitions on Spoofing and Other Forms of Manipulation
The Dodd–Frank Act added section 4c(a) to the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA) to expressly prohibit “spoofing” when trading
derivatives. 59 Spoofing is defined as entry of an order with intent to
cancel it. Intent to manipulate prices through the cancellation is not
required to violate the prohibition on spoofing. Although enforcement
on account of spoofing has been extremely rare, 60 a number of
56. See discussion infra Section II.A.
57. Andrew Ceresney, Director, Divison of Enforcement, Market Structure Enforcement:
Looking Back and Forward (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-speech-sifma-nyregional-seminar.html (“Errors in implementing policies and procedures can directly affect the market
as a whole and cause significant harm.”).
58. Regulations requiring controls over trading software can deter inadvertent order entry, but
fail to internalize the costs to market participants where algorithms produce imbalanced order
cancellation by design. Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5 requires a broker or dealer who accesses markets to
have, document, and maintain a system of risk management controls and procedures that are reasonably
designed to manage the risk of its market access. Two categories of risk are subject to management
under the rule: (1) financial risk, such as that posed by erroneous orders or orders that exceed capital and
credit limits; and (2) regulatory risk, such as the risk that pre-trade regulatory requirements will not be
satisfied. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-5 (2016). The rule is designed to reduce risks from increased trading
automation and to help ensure that firms have mechanisms in place to minimize the impact purposeful
as well as accidental damaging trading conduct.
59. Criminal Complaint, supra note 5, ¶ 51.
60. In addition to the case against Sarao, there have been two other criminal cases for spoofing:
Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Milrud, No. 2:15-cr-00455 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2015) and
Indictment, United States v. Coscia, No. 14-cr-00551 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2014). As of January 1, 2016, of
the three, only the case against Michael Coscia has proceeded through trial, which ended in a guilty
verdict on all counts (including the first guilty verdict for criminal violation of the CEA’s anti-spoofing
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exchanges have regularly experienced daily cancellation to trade ratios
exceeding 1 to 10. 61 In other words, the average trader should expect
with 90% likelihood that she cancels any order she places. Of course,
there is heterogeneity across traders and not all times of the day are
equal. A look at trading data will show that some traders regularly
cancel well over 90% of their orders. The distinction between
intentionally canceling orders and knowing with 90% (or much higher)
certainty that any order being placed will be cancelled and then placing
hundreds if not thousands of them on an hourly basis is like the
distinction between intentionally shooting a group of people and
indiscriminately firing an automatic weapon into a crowd. The
difference between the two scenarios is that the latter is (thankfully)
extremely rare, while the former is the norm on many electronic
exchanges. The scienter requirement is at best absurd when it is the sole
dividing line between widely and persistently practiced conduct and
prohibited conduct. 62
Of the handful of cases that have thus far been brought for spoofing,

provision). Jury Verdict, United States v. Coscia, No. 14-cr-00551 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2015). In addition,
there have been a handful of cases involving spoofing that were brought by the CFTC under the antispoofing or more general anti-manipulation provision, with the majority of them having been settled.
CFTC v. Oystacher, No. 15-cv-9196, 2016 BL 273700 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2015); Complaint, CFTC v.
Khara, No. 1:15-cv-03497 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2015); Complaint, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC,
No. 1:15-cv-03398 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2015); In re Panther Energy Trading LLC, CFTC No. 13-26, 2013
WL 3817473 (July 22, 2013); Complaint, CFTC v. Moncada, No. 1:12-cv-8791 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4,
2012); In re Gelber Group, LLC, CFTC No. 13-15, 2013 WL 525839 (Feb. 8, 2013); In re Bunge
Global Markets, Inc., CFTC No. 11-10, 2011 WL 1099346 (Mar. 22, 2011); In re UBS AG and UBS
Sec. Japan Co., Ltd., CFTC No. 13-09, 2012 WL 6642376 (Dec. 19, 2012); In re RP Martin Holdings
Ltd. and Martin Brokers (UK) Ltd., CFTC No. 14-16, 2014 WL 2003211 (May 15, 2014). The SEC has
also brought cases for conduct involving intentional order cancellations, frequently against the broker–
dealers through which the orders were placed on the theory of inadequate customer supervision.
Briargate Trading, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9959, Exchange Act Release No. 76104, 2015 WL
5868196 (Oct. 8, 2015); Complaint, SEC v. Milrud, No. 2:15-cv-00237 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2015);
Wedbush Sec. Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 73652, 110 SEC Docket 1687, 2014 WL 6480278 (Nov.
20, 2014); Visionary Trading LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71871, 108 SEC Docket 2594, 2014 WL
1338258 (Apr. 4, 2014); Biremis Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 68456, 105 SEC Docket 862, 2012
WL 6587520 (Dec. 18, 2012); Hold Brothers On-Line Inv. Servs., LLC, Exchange Act Release No.
67924, 104 SEC Docket 2686, 2012 WL 4359224 (Sept. 25, 2012); Pomper, SEC Lit. Release No.
17221 (Nov. 5, 2001), SEC Lit. Release No. 17479 (Apr. 19, 2002).
61. Summary Metrics by Exchange, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (last updated Feb. 2,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/opa/data/market-structure/marketstructuredata-by-exchange.html (follow
“Market Activity Metrics by Exchange, 2012 Q1 - 2016 Q4 (zip, 1.5 mb)” hyperlink; then view
“stock_cancel_to_trade”.)
62. Although this language is strong, I believe it is defensible. The outcome here—order
cancellation—represents the great majority of outcomes from the conduct in question—the placing of an
order. Thus, many traders know that their regular placement of orders will result in the great majority
being cancelled. This is unlike the example of a car manufacturer that knows some vehicles will fail
because relatively few vehicles do fail, and where a failure occurs, product liability theory can lead to
internalization of (some of the) costs. In contrast, the degradation of price information in the order book
cannot be deterred through private suit (or public action).
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the most famous is against a young man who lived with his parents in a
modest house in an immigrant suburb near London, Navinder Singh
Sarao. 63 Mr. Sarao is accused of extensive spoofing that lasted over 200
days and, most dramatically, contributing to the so called “Flash Crash”
of May 6, 2010 when financial markets lost approximately $1 trillion
(only to recover later that same day). 64 Mr. Sarao’s manipulative
strategy consisted of placing and then canceling large sell orders to
project excess supply. 65 The fictive supply drove down prices, allowing
Sarao to buy low and then, after canceling his fictive sell orders, sell
high. In total, Sarao is alleged to have made over $40 million in
trading. 66 Because he wrote e-mails saying as much, there is little doubt
that Mr. Sarao intended to cancel the orders being placed on his behalf
by software he customized. In general, cases alleging spoofing are
thought to be difficult to win due to the technical nature of the conduct
and lack of direct evidence on the mental state.67 If enforcement
authorities pursue spoofing cases solely where direct evidence of mental
state is available, such as in Sarao’s case, to the exclusion of cases
where the pattern of conduct plainly shows that expansive order
cancellation was consciously expected by the trader, the results will be
regressive enforcement and gross under-enforcement. 68
There is authority to punish distortive trading outside the prohibition
on spoofing derivatives. Derivatives and securities laws both prohibit
manipulative trading on exchanges under sections 6(c)(c) and 9(a)(2) of

63. Suzi Ring, John Detrixhe & Liam Vaughan, The Alleged Flash-Trading Mastermind Lived
With His Parents and Couldn’t Drive, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (June 9, 2015, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-09/the-alleged-flash-trading-mastermind-lived-withhis-parents-and-couldn-t-drive.
64. Criminal Complaint, supra note 5.
65. Id. ¶ 14 (“By placing multiple large-volume orders . . . at different price points, Sarao created
the false appearance of substantial supply in order to fraudulently induce other market participants to
react to his deceptive market information. Sarao thus artificially depressed . . . prices. With the aid of
an automated trading program, Sarao was able to all but eliminate his risk of unintentionally executing
these orders by modifying and ultimately canceling them before execution. Meanwhile, he exploited his
manipulation to reap large trading profits by executing other, real orders.”).
66. Id. ¶ 39.
67. Jacob Gershman, Spoofing Trial Gets Underway in Chicago, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Oct. 26,
2015, 10:51 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/10/26/spoofing-trial-gets-underway-in-chicago/.
68. Evidence of a trader’s intent to cancel an order may be obtained from multiple sources.
Besides e-mails and other records in which a trader may admit an intention to cancel orders, the
government may look at the code directing trading activity. The logic according to which orders are
placed and cancelled by the code will reflect whether some orders are placed in a manner designed to
ensure they are not executed. Reviewing e-mails and similar evidence, however, poses lower costs to
prosecutors than analyzing complex trading software. Law schools, business schools, investment banks,
and other institutions inculcate us to avoid writing when discussing sensitive subjects. As a result,
cheaply accessible evidence of intent is more likely to be left by traders from less privileged
backgrounds.
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the CEA and section 9 of the Exchange Act. 69 Violation of these
sections also requires specific intent. 70 Proving manipulation in
securities markets requires showing that a practice was “intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.” 71 Actions for
manipulation of derivatives markets require the following showing:
[(1)] the accused ha[s] the ability to influence market prices; (2)
that the accused specifically intended to create or effect a price or
price trend that does not reflect legitimate forces of supply and
demand; (3) that artificial prices existed; and (4) that the accused
caused the artificial prices. 72
The second prong of this standard will rarely be met by automatic
trading systems, even where they frequently or almost always cancel the
orders they place.
That is because the cancellations may be
characterized as reacting to market dynamics rather than intending to
lead them. Such would be the case with market makers canceling their
lowest offers as prices rise (or, reciprocally, canceling their highest bids
as prices decline).
Furthermore, even where an automatic trading system was designed
to cancel orders to exploit the resulting moves in prices, identifying such
a trading system among the legion of other algorithms engaging in
69. The SEC has brought several actions against traders using fictive orders to manipulate prices.
See, e.g., In the Briargate Trading, LLC, Securities Act Release No. 9959, Exchange Act Release No.
76104, 2015 WL 5868196 (Oct. 8, 2015); SEC v. Milrud, No. 2:15-cv-00237 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2015);
Visionary Trading LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 71871, 108 SEC Docket 2594, 2014 WL 1338258
(Apr. 4, 2014). These actions, however, involved traders who had specifically intended to create or
affect a price or price trend that does not reflect legitimate forces of supply and demand. Additional
actions for order cancellations in securities markets have been brought by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) for violations of FINRA Rule 2010 (just and equitable principles of
trade), Exchange Act § 15(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. 178o(c)(3) (2012) (market access deficiencies), and/or
FINRA Rule 3110 (supervisory failures).
70. There are additional prohibitions under securities and derivatives law against fraud
committed through material statements or omissions, where the fraud must be intentional or
reckless. An argument may be made that fictitious quotes are in themselves material misstatements so
that market manipulation may be punished on the basis of reckless conduct (rather than solely
intent). However, even this argument would need to establish some level of scienter beyond negligence.
Under the SEC and CFTC rules prohibiting fraudulent conduct, supporting “recklessness” requires a
showing of “an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care, . . . which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it.” City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001). It is hard
to see how this standard may ever be met where cancellations are over ten times more common than
executed transactions in the market and there is no public data as to the distribution of cancellations by
industry participants.
71. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
72. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive
Devises and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41398, 41407 (July 14, 2011) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
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substantial order cancellations would be difficult. Based solely on
observing trading behavior, how can a regulator tell if an algorithm is
designed to profit from issuing orders and then cancelling them or
happens to profit from such behavior while pursuing other ends? A
broad subpoena for traders’ code, even if feasible to obtain, would yield
an evidentiary record that would be extraordinarily expensive to review,
analyze, and—where suspect designs were identified—translate for a
neutral fact finder. In this system, we should expect that consistent
manipulation takes place without prosecution—at least at a low level.
Sarao’s case and other actions against manipulation highlight a
separate challenge to addressing price distortive trading through
traditional enforcement means. 73 U.S. authorities have been stymied by
the international nature of distortive trading. Andrew Ceresney has
observed this struggle:
An additional complexity [in bringing anti-manipulation cases] is
that this type of trading often originates overseas, from traders who
access the U.S. markets through broker–dealers that act as market
access providers. For example, the recent case against [a]
Canadian man involved traders mostly based in China and Korea,
and our case several years ago against Biremis Corporation and its
co-owners involved four-to-five thousand traders in over thirty
different countries. 74
By taxing order cancellation, fictive order entry may be deterred without
having to engage in complex jurisdictional negotiation. The non-trivial
challenges of extradition and other cross-border processes add to the
otherwise significant administrative costs of investigating and bringing
enforcement actions against complex and technical activity. 75
The ubiquity of order cancellations in today’s financial markets poses
a puzzle when contrasted to the few dozen enforcement cases that have
been brought for spoofing and related conduct. Enforcement may be
disproportionate for one of two reasons. Either the cancellations are
benign and the lack of cases represents judicious use of enforcement
discretion, or the cancellations are malign and enforcement is
constrained by legal, political, resource-based, or other considerations.
73. See, e.g., Complaint, CFTC v. Khara, No. 1:15-cv-03497 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2015).
74. Ceresney, supra note 57.
75. Id. (“[O]ur market structure investigations are increasingly dominated by our need to
understand the technology that forms the backbone of our markets. This includes the computer codes
that direct those systems; and more and more, studying computer codes, and the data logs that show how
the codes operate, are essential steps in our investigations. It is often the case that we simply cannot do
a meaningful market structure investigation without analyzing extremely large sets of orders and
trades.”).
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The former would be the case if order cancellation does not actually
undermine price accuracy. Cancellations may be largely innocuous if
they do not affect the balance of supply and demand reflected in the
order book. 76 It is understood that the order book is an incomplete
representation of overall supply and demand in the market. As noted
above, orders may be cancelled. Furthermore, some supply and demand
is not (immediately) expressed in orders, particularly when the supply
and demand is conditional on events that have yet to occur. For
purposes of accurate pricing, it is important only that there be a
predictable relationship between the supply and demand expressed in
the order book and the overall supply and demand outstanding in the
market. Only activity that disrupts the relationship between observed
supply and demand in the order book and actual supply and demand
impairs the public good of order book price information. It is this
activity that warrants regulation.
Supply and demand reflected in order books may be exaggerated as
well as understated; trading conduct that has either effect may be
distortive. In the absence of cancellations, order entry is costly and
ultimately self-fulfilling—a bid order represents demand irrespective of
whether the trader placing it intends to enter into a transaction unless
that bid order can be cancelled. Cancellation, however, allows traders to
costlessly distort market expectations through entering orders and
canceling them prior to their execution. 77 Although any cancellation
introduces noise into the estimate of supply and demand, cancellations
are particularly pernicious when they disproportionately affect demand
or supply. These cases implicate the balance of demand and supply in
the market, rather than simply the volume. Greater distortion will occur
if the entry and cancellation of a set of orders occurs in a shorter period.
Tighter timelines between entry and cancellation expose the trader to a
lower risk that the order will be matched. Faster cancellation is also
likely to contribute to greater volatility and increase processing costs for
other market participants.
Technology has enabled disruption through reducing the costs of high
levels of order entry and cancellation, even by relatively insignificant
market participants like Navinder Sarao. 78 Technology has also
increased sensitivity to market trends through enabling trading to

76. Even in this case, however, unbiased cancellations increase the noise-to-signal ratio in orderbook information.
77. Even without order cancellations, however, it is conceivable that the relationship between
supply and demand reflected in the order book and actual supply and demand is disrupted through
fluctuations in the speed with which actual supply and demand is expressed in orders.
78. Technology is a sufficient but not necessary predicate to distortive order cancellation. See
Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Milrud, No. 2:15-cr-00455 (D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2015).
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process and respond to market trends almost instantaneously. 79
Heightened sensitivity can lead to the converse of distortive order
cancellation, namely excessive order forbearance. Algorithms guiding
trading detect changes in market depth or direction reflected in order
book information, and can respond through withdrawing order flow
pending re-equilibration. Withdrawal itself creates a signal that may
lead other algorithmic traders to withdraw and thus create an artificial
dearth of orders that under-represents supply and demand. It was
Sarao’s exaggeration of supply as well as responsive reduction of
demand by unrelated market participants that precipitated the artificial
decline of prices in the morning of May 6, 2010. There is, however, a
notable difference between the vulnerability of price information to
order exaggeration and understatement.
The former may be
accomplished by a single trader. In contrast, because in typical
circumstances no single trader represents a significant portion of order
flow, a single trader’s withdrawal from the market cannot, generally
speaking, distort price information. However, the correlated withdrawal
of traders in response to market events such as spoofing can and has led
to distortionary under-statement of supply and demand.
Cancellations may be the byproduct of trading algorithms intended to
reap profits through means other than market manipulation. Irrespective
of the intent behind cancellations, fictive orders can distort price
information and social welfare would be improved through forcing
traders to internalize the cost of these distortions. 80 Statistically, it is
highly unlikely that strategies relying on frequent order cancellations do
not distort supply and demand levels ex post even if bids and offers are
entered at the same rate and are equally likely to be cancelled ex ante.
This phenomenon is explored in more detail below, but the intuition is
simple. If we take a large number of coins and start flipping each of
those coins, some coins will exhibit repeated streaks of heads or tails. In
other words, although ex ante the coins are as likely to come up heads as
they are to come up tails, in practice, some coins will exhibit more of
one than the other. These coins are analogous to algorithmic trading
that enters and cancels bids and offers with equal ex ante probability.
Even in this ideally unbiased scenario, some algorithms will generate

79. Graham Partington, Richard Philip & Amy Kwan, Is High Frequency Trading Beneficial to
Market Quality? (Ctr. for Int’l Fin. And Regulation, Paper No. 083/2015, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2673873.
80. As recent incidents of inadvertent market disruption have shown, trading algorithms can
distort prices and skew markets significantly even where they are not designed to profit through
manipulation. Knight Capital Ams. LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 70694, 107 SEC Docket 2303,
2013 WL 5631976 (Oct. 16, 2013); Goldman, Sachs & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 75331, 2015
WL 3956011 (June 30, 2015).
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more bids and some will generate more offers. 81 Although it is possible,
it is not plausible that widespread trends in order cancellation do not
adversely affect price discovery.
As discussed above, current regulation of distortive order entry is
based on enforcement actions that must show mens rea. This approach
is inadequate for addressing distortive activities that are a byproduct
rather than the goal of trading activity. Not only is enforcement
authority limited, but what enforcement authority there is may not be
fully utilized.
There may be a second response to the puzzle of why so little
enforcement occurs notwithstanding the ubiquity of order cancellations.
Even if cancellations do distort prices, there may be respectable or
simply practical constraints on policing them. The costs of penalizing
traders that engage in distortive cancellations82 may be greater than the
benefits from improved price accuracy. The costs may come in one of
two forms. First, administrative costs would have to be expended to
investigate and bring actions against distortionary traders. The SEC has
acknowledged the difficulty and expense of bringing anti-manipulation
actions. 83 Cases of intentional market manipulation can go unpunished
due to the burdens of showing mens rea as well as jurisdictional
challenges when trading takes place in a cross-border context. Second,
there may be broader costs to society for penalizing fictive orders to the
extent that order cancellation and other distortive conduct enables
liquidity provision.
An automated tax, or fee, charged upon order cancellation has
significant potential to improve on the current balance between
protecting the accuracy of prices, eliciting liquidity, and minimizing
administrative costs. The design of the proposed tax on fictive orders
takes both of these costs into account, keeping administrative costs low
and targeting trading behavior to reduce impact on liquidity. It is
standard to deploy Pigovian taxes in contexts where private conduct
imposes externalities on third parties, such as through polluting a public

81. One may argue that among a set of traders, the imbalance created by one trader may offset
the imbalance created by another trader (e.g., an artificial excess of bids may offset an artificial excess
of orders). This is no more likely to be true than the imbalance created by one trader exacerbating the
imbalance created by another. Thus we cannot assume that misleading noise will be drowned out by
other noise, because that other noise may be misleading in the same direction. As discussed below, the
paper’s proposal would only tax significant order cancellation imbalances and thus occasional small
imbalances (or symmetric cancellations) would not be affected. However, an elaboration on the tax may
be developed that measures the net rate of bid/offer cancellations in the market for a product and only
penalizes asymmetric cancelations that increase that rate.
82. See infra Section III.A for a discussion of which cancellation activities are more likely to
distort prices.
83. See Ring, et al., supra note 63.
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resource. 84 The public resource in the trading context is the supply and
demand curve data provided by the order book. The tax should be
carefully designed to protect that public good while differentiating
between more and less pernicious—as well as benign—forms of trading
activity. A proposal for such a tax is developed in the next part. The
proposal protects the nature of order books as a public good, while also
deterring manipulative cancellation strategies. Because manipulation
both deters liquidity and distorts prices, the strategy can increase both
liquidity and price discovery. 85 It is key to note that the proposal is not
simply the introduction of a Pigovian tax to protect a public good. The
proposal is specifically to introduce an automated Pigovian tax in a fully
digital context where behavior can be perfectly and freely tracked. It is
the tremendous difference in administrative costs that primarily
commends the proposed tax. Before turning to the proposal, however, it
is useful to situate the debate on price distortion through order
cancellation within the traditional contractual framework governing
offers and execution of contracts.
B. Contractual Principles Neglect Third-Party Interest in Price
Information
Without more, an offer to enter into an agreement may usually be
withdrawn by the offeror prior to its acceptance. 86 There are exceptions
where by its terms, the offer is firm for a period of time. 87 However, in
the typical case, no contractual rights or obligations arise on account of
an offer until it has been accepted. 88 Furthermore, warranties and other
default terms observable in some transactional contexts enable
withdrawal from a transaction subsequent to its execution. 89 Why isn’t
liberal optionality as to execution equally justified with respect to
financial transactions taking place through public order books?
Common principles of contract formation view agreements as
vehicles to mutually beneficial exchange between the counterparties.
This view ignores the positive externalities from information regarding
84. See Carlton & Loury, supra note 15.
85. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711 (2006).
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 36 (AM. LAW INSTIT. 1981).
87. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW. INSTIT. 2014) (“An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods
in a signed writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack
of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may
such period of irrevocability exceed three months.”).
88. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 271, 271 (2004).
89. Omri Ben-Shahar & Eric A. Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law, 40 J. LEGAL
STUD. 115 (2011).
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parties’ willingness to enter into contractual arrangements. In the case
of idiosyncratic transactions, such as the contract with a neighbor to
mow a lawn, the public benefits from reliable information as to supply
and demand curves is slight. The value of information increases with
the volume of fungible transactions expected in the market, for example,
the price at which a merchant might sell a lawn mower. With respect to
fungible assets, price information as to prior transactions helps thirdparty market participants value their inventory (in the case of sellers)
and budget for purchases (in the case of buyers). Financial products are
not simply fungible assets. As discussed earlier, their prices are proxies
informing important business decisions such as management retention,
project selection, and hedging. As a result, third parties derive
unusually high informational value from the terms on which others
transact in financial products. Preserving the positive informational
externality from transparent financial markets is the first justification for
distinguishing transactions in financial products from ordinary
contractual arrangements.
The second justification also stems from the fungibility of exchangetraded financial products. 90 The fungibility of transactions and the fact
that financial assets—unlike cars, homes, and most other assets—do not
deteriorate with use or time means that reselling is an alternative to nonexecution. In other words, a bidder that is forced to go through with the
purchase and denied a rescission right will at worst be able to turn
around and sell the instrument. Some loss may be experienced on the
sale, which would consist of a mix of transaction costs and a decrease in
the value of the instrument. The former represents a social loss; the
latter represents a private loss to the bidder but an offsetting private gain
to the prior seller. 91 Thus, in markets where transaction costs are low,
the social costs of removing optionality to cancel the order or unwind
the transaction should also be low.

90. Bilateral swaps are traditionally non-fungible due to the idiosyncratic credit risk of each
counterparty, however, clearing brings fungibility to swap markets. See Ilya Beylin, A Reassessment of
the Clearing Mandate: How the Clearing Mandate Affects Swap Trading Behavior and the
Consequences for Systemic Risk, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1141 (2015).
91. To the extent that the bidder in this example is a liquidity provider, its losses may result in it
widening the spread at which it is willing to transact. This widening of the spread will lead to social
losses as parties forego transacting. However, the inability to cancel an order also results in the liquidity
provider transacting at a lower spread than it would have otherwise and thus enabling additional
transactions. The net result—absent transaction costs—should be expected to be neutral as
counterparties on subsequent transactions end up subsidizing counterparties on the transactions that
could not be cancelled.
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C. Anonymity Precludes Reputational Constraints on Fictive Orders
The electronic environment for trading financial products differs in
fundamental respects from other contexts for exchange. In addition to
the differences noted above, most securities and derivatives exchanges
function on the basis of anonymity. The identity of the party standing
behind a bid or offer is unknown to other market participants, rather
only the quantity and price is known. Anonymity prevents discipline
through reputational feedback. For example, when a new order arrives
from a hedge fund that has cancelled 999,998 of its last 1,000,000 orders
there is no way to distinguish that unreliable order from a rock-solid
order placed by a mutual fund that has executed 1,000,000 of its last
1,000,000 orders. In contrast, if a merchant advertised it was selling
lawn mowers for $150 and then, after customers showed up to the store,
cancelled the offer, reputational repercussions would serve as both an ex
ante deterrent to the cancellation and an ex post signal to further
prospective customers to take the merchant’s offer with some salt.
This failing of anonymous markets for financial products may partly
be remedied by the exchange tracking order cancellation rates by trader
and enriching order information with the cancellation rate of the trader
placing the order. This approach would increase the informational
burden on market participants—requiring them to appreciate not only
the order book, but the reliability of the orders in it—however, it would
also make the relationship between the order book and actual supply and
demand more predictable. Qualification of orders with cancellation
rates as well as other characteristics (e.g., if an order is of a type that
lapses at a certain time or under certain conditions) would assist market
participants in predicting actual supply and demand based on order book
information. These advances in order book transparency are desirable.
However, because price information is a public good, advances in order
book content voluntarily developed by exchanges and other commercial
market participants should not be expected to attain socially optimal
levels.
Disclosure enriching order book information may be mandated, but
this policy would not yield ideal results. Parsing through mandated
disclosures would impose information-processing costs on market
participants. Relative to a tax on fictive orders, mandatory disclosure
would impose costs on those trading in the market generally rather than
those parties cancelling their order flow. As a result, the costs imposed
by order cancellations would not be internalized by the traders placing
the orders and the externality of order cancellation would be mitigated
but not internalized. Put simply: it would be other market participants
that bear the costs of understanding disclosure rather than those who
engage in distortive high-volume orders and cancellations. Furthermore,
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disclosure of cancellation rates may undermine anonymity. Anonymity
in financial markets allows traders to execute transactions without
letting other market participants learn their positions. This feature
protects traders from strategic behavior such as where market
participants know that a party has a large position that it is seeking to
liquidate, and take advantage of the impending supply by reducing
demand at all but the lowest prices. 92 If cancellation rates were
published, they could be used to track traders with unusual cancellation
rates. However, this risk could be mitigated by rounding or binning
cancellation rates.
Enrichment of order book information with
cancellation rates and other order characteristics (such as whether the
order would expire at a given time) would be helpful and could mitigate
distortion from fictive orders; however, because parsing disclosure is
costly, it may be a second best solution relative to the Pigovian tax
proposed by this paper.
IV. IMPLEMENTING A TAX ON FICTIVE TRADING
A trader placing an order has private information as to the likelihood
the order will be cancelled: only the trader knows the conditions under
which she would cancel the order. A tax imposed on cancellations
encourages traders to self-screen when placing an order. In the status
quo, traders can enter orders irrespective of how unlikely the order is to
be executed. If a tax were imposed, traders would omit placing orders
that were both (a) likely to be cancelled, and (b) unlikely to produce
much gain if executed. How the tax is designed will affect just which
orders a trader will forego. At the outset, however, the administrative
advantage to an automated tax should be noted. Beyond the fixed costs
of developing the tax software, the costs of applying it on a market-wide
basis are minimal. 93 Unlike enforcement actions, which require
investigative and litigation resources, a tax automatically withdrawn
92. Terrence Hendershott, Electronic Trading in Financial Markets, IT PROF., July/Aug. 2003,
at 12, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hender/ITpro.pdf (“Anonymity is potentially important for
informed institutional investors, because less-informed traders may attempt to copy their strategy. In
addition, if other market participants can obtain prior or contemporaneous knowledge of transactions,
they may attempt to trade before the institutional investors can complete their trades, a practice known
as front running. In financial markets, any sort of front running or information leakage is a serious
concern.”).
93. At the outset, the proposal is to incentivize exchanges to implement taxes on fictive orders.
Experimentation and sensitivity to differences in trading among product types may lead to successful
models that can be imposed across exchanges. The magnitude of the tax could vary by product. Current
average order cancellation rates can be used to create benchmarks, excesses beyond which would be
taxed. The tax could be adjusted through applying a number of factors, including: (a) transaction size,
with larger transactions subject to higher taxes if cancelled; and (b) responsiveness of liquidity measures
to the tax, with markets where the tax has a lower impact on liquidity being subject to a higher tax.
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from a trader’s account upon cancellation is highly scalable and is
efficiently deployed even against minor violations (which may add up to
significant distortion in the aggregate). This is a special feature of the
electronic trading environment, where each new order and cancellation
can be reviewed automatically without additional human oversight. As
a result, the tax offers an inexpensive, comprehensive, and focused
means for deterring price-distorting orders. Manual enforcement tools,
in contrast, are expensive, selective, and potentially prone to greater
error. 94
A. Fictive Order Taxes Can Preserve Liquidity
A tax on price-distortive order cancellations may be objected to on
liquidity preservation grounds. The argument would be that some rate
of order cancellations is necessary to carry out market making strategies.
Market makers adjust their spread, i.e., the difference between their
highest bid and lowest offer, to recoup losses on transactions with
informed parties. 95 Adjusting the spread involves canceling resting limit
orders within the spread. Thus, cancellations supporting market-making
strategies may on net benefit markets through their role in increasing
liquidity.
Refinements to the tax structure or adaptation by market makers can
allow liquidity provision strategies relying on cancellations to persist.
First, the tax could be structured so as to exempt cancellations of bids
that are balanced out by cancellations of offers. Cancelled orders would
be treated as offsetting not merely if one was a bid and the other an
offer, but if they were equidistant from the market midpoint. If demand
and supply are exaggerated to the same extent, it is less likely that
traders’ expectations of price movements are altered. 96 Second, no
charge may apply to imbalances so long as they do not exceed a de
minimis threshold that could be adjusted upward based on executed
transactions entered into by the trader. The de minimis quota and the tax
94. If a trader knows that its next order will be cancelled with probability of p and the tax on the
cancellation will be t, then the trader will only place the order if the expected value of the executed
transaction, y, satisfies the following formula: y ≥ pt/(1-p). Note that this formula is synonymous with
the expected value of the order being greater than zero, or y(1-p) – pt ≥ 0. For a given tax (t), this
inequality can be satisfied by decreasing p or increasing y. As a result, a tax on cancellations will
incentivize traders to forego placing orders that (a) have a higher likelihood of being cancelled, and (b)
have lower expected returns if executed. Notably, reducing p both reduces the denominator and
increases the numerator in the decisional formula, so the former type of screening is likely to
predominate (in other words, a 1% decrease in p has a greater effect than a 1% increase in y). However,
it is clear that taxes on cancellations will not only reduce the incidence of cancelled orders but also
increase the minimum expected profit that would motivate an order being placed.
95. See Fox, et al., supra note 36.
96. See supra note 81.
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could be applied on the basis of how many orders were cancelled in a
given unit of time. Tighter timelines between entry and cancellation
expose the trader to a lower risk that the order will be matched, thus
increasing the likelihood the order will result in distorting expectations
rather than providing liquidity. Faster cancellation is also likely to
contribute to greater volatility and increase processing costs for other
market participants. The speed of cancellation should be qualified by
the distance of the order from the market midpoint, as less marketable
orders can be left in the order book without the risk of being matched for
longer periods of time. In other words, an order at or near the market
price may be cancelled after a shorter period of time without incurring
the tax than an order outside the marketable range. In this manner,
liquidity providers would have buffers to absorb ex post distortive
effects from strategies that are ex ante as likely to generate executed
bids as offers; and these buffers would expand with the amount of
liquidity actually being provided by the trader. Third, in addition to
buffers to exclude de minimis quantities of cancellations, the tax could
be structured to apply in a non-linear fashion. Small numbers of
cancellations exceeding the de minimis threshold might result in a
nominal fee; however, increasingly greater imbalances would result in
fees that increase super-linearly (e.g., quadratically) to impose
significantly higher burdens on strategies that result in abnormally high
rates of cancellation.
By focusing penalties on high-volume,
imbalanced entry of fictive orders, the tax would reduce both
manipulative conduct and the use of trading strategies that incidentally
produced distortive trends. In other words, in keeping with the work of
Arthur Pigou, the tax would be aimed at order cancellations producing a
negative externality rather than order cancellations generally.
Market makers and other traders with legitimate reasons for reducing
orders would not be significantly burdened by a tax taking this structure.
That is because traders could continue to enter the same levels of
demand and supply into the order book, but do so via what are popularly
referred to as “iceberg” orders. Iceberg orders are limit orders that are
reflected only in (small) part in the order book; when that small part is
executed against, another small part of the order is revealed in the order
book, and so on, until the full order is filled. 97 For example, an iceberg
order to buy 100,000 shares of IBM may appear as a bid for 1,000
shares of IBM in the order book, with a new 1,000 share bid generated
once the first 1,000 shares are purchased and so on 98 more times until
the full order is filled. Like icebergs, which float with only a small

97. Iceberg Order, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/icebergorder.asp (last
visited Jan. 16, 2017).
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portion showing above water, the magnitude of an iceberg order is
largely invisible. This order type was originally created for institutional
investors and other traders placing large bids or offers so they could
execute without moving prices against them. 98 However, the iceberg
order also allows market makers to place a large block of liquidity into
the order book without distorting prices on its cancellation. Because the
tax would be levied only on the visible part of a cancelled order
(because the invisible part has no capacity to misrepresent supply and
demand), the total tax burden could remain minimal.
Revenues from order cancellations can be redistributed to market
participants contributing to liquidity and the accuracy of the order book.
This can be done through transferring proceeds to those that execute
orders, with proportionately greater amounts being transferred to those
executing orders when order book volumes are low. This targeted
subsidy can offset the deterrent effect the tax may have on order entry. 99
Furthermore, by allocating more of the subsidy to traders maintaining
liquidity in conditions of scarcity (e.g., traders entering bids when
demand has withdrawn and prices are declining), the tax can counteract
market dynamics that lead to artificial under-statement of supply and
demand in the order book.
Through thoughtful design of the tax and adjustment on the part of
market participants, the burden of the tax could be focused on those that
pollute markets with misinformation. The pollution analogy is apt on
two dimensions. First, like pollution, fictive orders interfere with use of
a shared resource, namely price information. Second, fictive orders, like
pollution, may be a byproduct of valuable commercial activity. To
arguments that in some cases order cancellation enables liquidity
provision, it may be observed that notwithstanding the benefits of
economic activity it may accompany, we fine pollution to reduce its
incidence and encourage adaptations of cleaner technologies.
Notably, cleaner technology may involve a new market structure
without a prominent role for market makers. Market makers are not a
predicate for effective market function. Although described as
providing “liquidity,” they in effect provide a form of financing and are
substitute for other forms of financing. This becomes evident when the
operations of an archetypal market maker are considered. Market
makers traditionally end each day “flat,” meaning that a market maker
executes as many bids as offers. 100 In other words, market makers act as
98. Id.
99. The subsidy would increase y in the preceding formula. See Eisenberg, supra note 88.
100. See, eg., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RECENT ACTIONS APPEAR TO HAVE
INITIALLY REDUCED FAILURES TO DELIVER, BUT MORE INDUSTRY GUIDANCE IS NEEDED 17 (2009),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/289477.pdf (“According to SEC . . . most [market makers] seek a net
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intermediaries between market participants that desire to change their
net positions, but market makers do not themselves enter into net nonzero positions for appreciable periods of time. A market maker allows a
seller to dispose of a position notwithstanding that there is no buyer in
the market at the time (and reciprocally, through carrying short
inventories, a market maker can enable a buyer to obtain a position
notwithstanding that there is no seller). As an equivalent to selling a
position to a market maker, the seller could accept a non-recourse
loan 101 collateralized by the position from a third party and when a
buyer arrives, repay that loan, reclaim the position, and sell it to the
buyer. The two transactional structures are equivalent from the
perspective of the seller and the buyer. Arbitrage analysis implies that
the interest received on the loan would be equivalent to the aggregate
discount the seller provides to the market maker and the premium the
market maker charges to the buyer. Thus market making only has a
useful function (and merits preservation) to the extent that non-recourse
financing of the asset is inefficient. 102 To the extent that introduction of
pollution taxes on fictive orders inhibits market making, the inhibition
will have no social costs to the extent that alternative financing exists for
the asset.
The trade-off between liquidity and price integrity explains why
simply banning exchanges from supporting order cancellations would
not be as productive as a Pigovian tax. Some liquidity provision
strategies rely on order cancellations. These could not be executed if
orders could no longer be cancelled, with accompanying losses in
liquidity. In other words, the net social impact of some strategies
involving order cancellations is likely to be positive and banning these
strategies outright, rather than forcing traders to internalize the harms,
will forego potentially productive activity. That said, because shortterm financing is a substitute for liquidity provision, the social costs may
be limited through development of short term financing markets for
financial products.

‘flat’ position in a security at the end of each day—offsetting short sales of a security with purchases of
that security. . . .”).
101. If it was desirable to reduce risk of market intermediaries, the loan could be made with
recourse to the borrower (presumably reducing the interest rate payable but diversifying the lender as
between the risk of loss on the collateral’s and the borrower’s unsecured credit).
102. An objection may be that exit of liquidity providers would reduce the number of executed
transactions and thus reduce the public good benefits of the ticker tape. This assumes, however, that
intra-day repo markets were non-transparent. Transparency could be imposed through, among other
means, regulation.
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B. Fictive Order Taxes Survive Critiques of Financial Transaction
Taxes
This article’s proposal to tax order cancellations is new to the
academic literature in law, however, there have been prior proposals to
tax financial activities. In particular, scholars have proposed and
jurisdictions have implemented taxes on executed financial transactions.
These taxes have been subject to a variety of criticisms. As discussed
below, these criticisms are largely inapplicable to a tax on fictive
transactions.
1. Financial Transaction Taxes Discourage Transfers
Taxing the transfer of a financial asset but not its retention biases
financial decision-making away from accumulating and rebalancing
financial portfolios through secondary markets. 103 As a result, the
private benefits realized from capital contribution, investment, and risk
transfer may be foregone. On first pass, the taxation of cancelled orders
should not affect the rate of transactions. By definition, executed
transactions are outside of the scope of a tax on fictive orders. More
realistically, however, a trader placing an order will expect with some
likelihood that conditions evolve prior to the order’s execution in a
manner that justifies its cancellation. 104 As a result, a tax on fictive
transactions may, at the margin, decrease transactional volumes. This
reduction may be counteracted, as already suggested, through using
proceeds from the tax to subsidize executed transactions. 105
Even without the cross-subsidy, the impact on transactional volumes
is likely to be significantly lower since it is cancelled rather than
executed orders that are taxed. A tax on consummated transactions fully
falls on those that actually engage in transfers of financial assets. In
contrast, a tax on order cancellations designed to deter exaggeration of
supply or demand disproportionately affects traders following fickle,
high-volume trading strategies. Trading designed to take advantage of
small pricing discrepancies, where the desirability of entering into a
transaction at a given price is sensitive to market movements observable
over short periods, is likely to absorb the brunt of the tax. Arbitrage
trading based on divergences between similar assets traded in different

103. Daniel Shaviro, The Financial Transactions Tax Versus (?) the Financial Activities Tax
(N.Y.
Univ.
Sch.
of
Law,
Research
Paper
No.
12-04,
2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1989163 [hereafter FTT versus FTA].
104. See Eisenberg, supra note 88.
105. The social value of marginal (as opposed to deeply inframarginal) trades in financial
instruments is questionable.
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markets represents a common example of such strategies. This type of
trading, generally speaking, does not significantly further the goals of
capital formation, savings, or risk transfer served by financial markets.
Rather, at best, it accelerates price discovery through improving the
accuracy of prices reflected in the record of executed transactions.
Deterrence of such trading shows a tension between the public good
provided by the order book and the public good provided by the ticker
tape. 106 A more accurate reflection of current supply and demand can
come at the expense of loss of granularity in the price data from
executed transactions.
2. Financial Transaction Taxes Impede Commercial Coordination
Financial transaction taxes, like other taxes on commercial inputs,
have been criticized for impeding business coordination.107 The more
transfers of inputs are taxed, the more expensive it is for businesses to
coordinate production through vertical supply contracts.108 This
general observation has limited applicability in the financial product
context. Financial products are generally not generated through a staged
process in which successive market participants refine and combine
inputs.109 A security is produced by an issuer and, once produced, is
not altered by subsequent transferees. Similarly, derivatives contracts
are produced exclusively through the interaction of the counterparties.
The concern that financial transaction taxes will impede financial
engineering is misplaced. If anything, a successful tool for reducing
price manipulation can encourage the creation of new financial products.
It is young financial products that are most susceptible to manipulation
as they tend to trade in thin markets where relatively low levels of abuse
can have appreciable price impact.

106. As shown in supra, note 94, the imposition of a tax on order cancellations increases the
expected profit that would have to be realized from a transaction for a non-zero probability of
cancellation. As a result, the tax will deter informed trading based on less significant insights regarding
the direction of prices while informed trading based on more substantial realizations will continue. Thus
information will accumulate with informed traders before being released into the market through
trading. This will result in increasing the increment from market price at which new informed
transactions are entered into. This increase, however, is likely to be small. Unlike liquidity providers
that may enter in limit orders and then cancel them as market conditions change, informed traders are
likely to enter marketable orders that are immediately executed, locking in expected gains from price
movement. As a result, informed traders are unlikely to be significantly deterred by the tax.
107. See, e.g., FTT versus FTA, supra note 103.
108. Id.
109. A prominent exception is securities issued by vehicles that themselves have collected
financial positions through purchasing securities and entering into derivatives contracts. Examples
include securitization vehicles. However, assembly of these vehicles does not require order
cancellation.
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3. Financial Transaction Taxes Are Susceptible to Avoidance
Financial transaction taxes may be ineffectual and counter-productive
if they can be avoided through shifting transactions to another
jurisdiction or another instrument.110 Sweden’s experience in the late
1980s stands as a stark reminder of the dangers of a poorly designed
transaction tax: within four years of the introduction of a tax linked to
receipt of Swedish brokerage services, more than half of Sweden’s
domestic securities trading moved to London.111 As a result, crossjurisdictional harmonization and administrative complexities in
imposing equivalent treatment on transactions in different places or
different instruments pose substantial challenges to the implementation
of financial transaction taxes.112 In contrast to wholesale migration of
trading activity, strategic responses to a tax on fictive transactions may
lead to sorting that improves market quality.
Self-selective departure of traders prone to high levels of distortive
order cancellations would contribute to specialization of markets.
Traders pursuing strategies involving little order cancellation would
continue to participate in the markets where the tax was imposed. In
fact, certain traders may find these markets more attractive following the
decline of volatility in order book volumes. On the other hand, traders
relying on strategies that generate frequent and imbalanced order
cancellation would migrate to other markets where the tax was lower or
absent.
C. Alternatives and Precedents to Fictive Order Taxes
Some financial exchanges have voluntarily imposed fees on distortive
activity such as order modifications and cancellations. As one example,
on a product-by-product basis, the CME imposes fees on traders that
depart from benchmark ratios of order cancellations and modifications
to order executions. 113 Known as the “Messaging Efficiency Program,”
110. See, e.g., LEONARD E. BURMAN, WILLIAM G. GALE, SARAH GAULT, BRYAN KIM, JIM NUNNS
& STEVE ROSENTHAL, TAX POLICY CTR., FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAXES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/07/Financial-TaxTransactions/FINANCIAL-TRANSACTION-TAXES.pdf (explaining the deterioration of Swedish
equity markets following the implementation of a poorly designed financial transaction tax).
111. Id.; FTT versus FTA, supra note 103; MARION G. WROBEL, PARLIAMENT OF CANADA,
FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAXES: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND THE LESSONS FOR CANADA
(1996), http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/bp419-e.htm.
112. WROBEL, supra note 111.
113. See CME GROUP, CME GLOBEX MESSAGING EFFICIENCY PROGRAM VERSION 8.4 (2016),
http://www.cmegroup.com/globex/files/revisedmep.pdf (“To encourage responsible messaging
practices, ensure efficient market operations, allow for broad market participation and foster high
quality liquid markets, CME Group adopted revisions to the CME Globex Messaging Efficiency

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol85/iss1/3

36

Beylin: Taxing Fictive Orders

2017]

TAXING FICTIVE ORDERS

127

this voluntarily adopted policy tracks cancellations, modifications, and
orders with certain “fill or kill” or “fill and kill” conditions. 114
Cancellations and modifications have similar effects in that they alter
the supply or demand levels reflected in an order book. The CME also
targets “fill or kill” [FOK] orders (i.e., orders that must be filled in full
or are cancelled), as well as “fill and kill” [FAK] orders with minimum
quantities attached (i.e., orders that must be filled to a specified extent to
avoid being cancelled).
The Messaging Efficiency Program applies relatively crude scoring.
Five forms of trading activity are assigned a score: modifications
assigned 1; cancellations, FAK orders (with qualifying minima), and
FOK orders assigned 3; and new orders assigned 0. 115 The sum of these
message types issued to the platform defines the numerator, and the total
number of executed orders defines the denominator. In this manner, a
higher score is given where more distortive orders are generated relative
to the liquidity provided. Even though the ratios are generally
calculated at the executing firm level, the CME retains discretion to
apply the ratio on more granular levels to target distortive desks or
traders. 116
The Messaging Efficiency Program can support order book integrity,
but is a blunter tool than the suggested tax on fictive orders. Unlike the
proposed fictive trade tax, the Message Efficiency Program does not
distinguish between offsetting cancellations of bids and offers and
asymmetric cancellations that lead to exaggerated supply or demand.
As a result, the fees imposed on those that exceed benchmark ratios fail
to narrowly target distortive trading behavior. Instead, the Message
Efficiency Program targets use of platform resources that does not result
in trade execution.
The Messaging Efficiency Program is susceptible to additional
criticisms. The equivalent treatment of FAK orders (with qualifying
minima) and FOK orders, on the one hand, with cancelled orders, on the
other hand, fails to recognize that FAKs and FOKs can and do result in
executed transactions. Moreover, FAKs and FOKs are placed with no
potential for deception as the conditions for their cancellation are
declared expressly when the order is being placed. Although to a
platform user, an unexecuted FAK or FOK may appear identical to an
order that is placed and then cancelled, that similarity is due to failure to
Program.”). As background, the CME is a storied financial institution (previously known as the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange) that provides exchange and clearing services for a number of financial
contracts.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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obtain liquidity from the platform rather than any misconduct by the
user. If the CME enriches order book information to include FAK and
FOK characteristics, the fleeting and conditional nature of these orders
would be clear to other traders and would not have potential to distort
expected supply and demand. Even without annotation, FAKs and
FOKs do not have the same potential distortive impact because their
cancellation is not subject to discretionary timing. Either the order is
sufficiently filled or it is not, and this is wholly outside of the trader’s
control. In contrast, a trader can cancel a resting order if and when she
wishes.
Finally, modifications to increase order size should be treated as
harmless rather than penalized because the trader can alternately send a
second order with the additional volume. 117 Similar to the discussion of
fictive trade tax design above, modifications should also be
distinguished based on whether they occur symmetrically with respect to
bid and offer orders as well as their timing relative to the placement of
the initial order. Notwithstanding these potential criticisms, the CME’s
approach represents a major and insightful step towards recognizing and
protecting the value of the order book.
Scholars have shown that similar exchange rules have been able to
improve market function, supporting that the proposed tax on order
cancellation may be desirable. The Oslo Stock Exchange implemented
a fee based on high order-to-trade ratios measured in one-second
increments. 118 Empirical analysis has found that this fee improved most
measures of market quality. 119 In contrast, an Italian exchange fee on
order cancellations exceeding specified ratios in the course of a day has
been found to impair market quality. 120 Following introduction of the
fee, the depth of liquidity available declined as would be expected when
market makers withdraw from liquidity-providing strategies that rely on
order cancellation to protect the market maker from shifts in prices. The

117. The availability of a costless alternative to increase order size through a second order can
also be seen as an argument that taxing modifications effecting increases should not matter as these
transactions would migrate into new orders.
118. Kjell Jørgensen, Johannes Skjeltorp & Bernt Arne Ødegaard, Throttling Hyperactive Robots:
Order to Trade Ratios at the Oslo Stock Exchange 9-10 (Mar. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (available
at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jhasbrou/SternMicroMtg/SternMicroMtg2016/Papers/93.pdf); see Oslo
Børs to Discourage Excessive Order Activity, OSLO BØRS (May 24, 2012),
http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/About-Oslo-Boers/News-from-Oslo-Boers/Oslo-Boers-todiscourage-excessive-order-activity. The Oslo Stock Exchange fee applies where the number of orders
input relative to each order carried out exceeds 70. The order activity that is included in the calculation
of this ratio principally relates to orders that are cancelled or amended within one second, and where the
change does not contribute to improved pricing or volume.
119. Jørgensen et al., supra note 118 at 15.
120. Sylvain Friederich & Richard Payne, Order-to-Trade Ratios and Market Liquidity, 50 J.
BANKING & FIN. 214, 222 (2015).
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Italian example illustrates the importance of applying the tax on market
distortive activity rather than on cancellations generally, and that the
timing of order cancellation relative to order entry matters. Balanced
order cancellation or cancellation that occurs over a longer time horizon
is less likely to impact prices and should be taxed at lower levels (if at
all). Like the prohibition on spoofing, the Italian tax is over-inclusive in
failing to distinguish benign from pernicious order cancellations.
Similarly, a Canadian exchange fee on both order and transaction
activity has been seen as unsuccessful. 121 Because the Canadian fee
falls on both cancelled and executed orders (as well as transactions), it is
expected to reduce liquidity as well as returns from informed trading.
Scholarship supports these predictions, finding that the Canadian fee
reduced market liquidity and the returns realized by retail investors. 122
The appropriate structure of taxes on fictive orders is likely to vary
with product type (as different products trade in differing quantities,
frequencies, and price increments) as well as market characteristics.123
Exchange experience shows that the design of the fee on order
cancellations is fundamental to a successful balancing of the interests
served by electronic markets. Design flaws can increase costs for all
market participants, impede liquidity, reduce ticker tape price discovery,
and otherwise undermine market function. The devil is in the detail, and
further experimentation with tax structures by exchanges is desirable
before a regulatory prescription is imposed. To that end, exchanges
should be delegated ample authority to develop taxes on order
cancellations and the implementation of such taxes may be given credit
against other market integrity oriented obligations imposed on
exchanges. For instance, an exchange that has demonstrated through
event studies that it has implemented a tax that improves reliability of
order book information without sacrificing liquidity may be allowed to
devote fewer resources to investigation of market manipulation activity.
Because exchanges are frequently in dependent relationships with their
liquidity providers, claims that taxes benefit order book quality should
be reviewed skeptically.
V. CONCLUSION
Current anti-manipulation and anti-spoofing prohibitions are
inadequate to protect markets in an era of algorithmic, high-speed
121. Katya Malinova, Andreas Park & Ryan Riordan, Do Retail Traders Suffer from High
Frequency
Traders?
1
(Oct.
3,
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(available
at
http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/milne/322/IIROC_FeeChange_submission_KM_AP3.pdf).
122. Id.
123. See supra note 93.
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trading. Intent is costly and difficult to establish, and underenforcement is the apparent norm. The current regime only weakly
protects markets from expropriation through manipulation, and does not
protect the public-good nature of order book information. The Pigovian
tax proposed in this paper would protect order book price information
from pollution and supplement existing, inadequate protections from
manipulation. This tax would improve on heretofore proposed financial
transaction taxes. Key to the proposal is that it would apply an
automated tax to activity that takes place in a fully digital context where
behavior can be perfectly and freely tracked. The pricing, i.e.,
appropriate amount to escrow and forfeit based on net order
cancellations would vary by instrument. The proceeds can be used to
subsidize orders during times when traders withdraw from the market.
It remains for future empirical research to determine appropriate
parameters for levying the tax.
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